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ABSTRACT
Frank Ankersmit is often perceived as a postmodern thinker, as a European Hayden
White, or as an author whose work in political philosophy can safely be ignored by those
interested only in his philosophy of history. Although none of these perceptions is entire-
ly wrong, they are of little help in understanding the nature of Ankersmit’s work and the
sources on which it draws. Specifically, they do not elucidate the extent to which Anker-
smit raises questions different from White’s, finds himself inspired by continental Euro-
pean traditions, responds to specifically Dutch concerns, and is as active as a public intel-
lectual as he has been prolific in philosophy of history. In order to propose a more com-
prehensive and balanced interpretation of Ankersmit’s work, this article offers a contex-
tual reading based largely on Dutch-language sources, some of which are unknown even
in the Netherlands. The thesis advanced is that Ankersmit draws consistently on nine-
teenth-century German historicism as interpreted by Friedrich Meinecke and advocated
by his Groningen teacher, Ernst Kossmann. Without forcing each and every element of
Ankersmit’s oeuvre into a historicist mold, the article demonstrates that some of its most
salient aspects can profitably be read as attempts at translating and modifying historicist
key notions into late twentieth-century categories. Also, without creating a father myth of
the sort that White helped create around his teacher William Bossenbrook, the article
argues that Ankersmit at crucial moments in his intellectual trajectory draws on texts and
authors central to Kossmann’s research interests.
Keywords: Frank Ankersmit, Ernst Kossmann, Johan Huizinga, historicism, representa-
tion, narrativism
INTRODUCTION
Frank Ankersmit is often perceived as an archetypical “postmodernist” philoso-
pher of history.1 More specifically, he is often read, if not as a “European Hay-
den White,”2 then at least as a historical theorist whose reflections on the histo-
rian’s language, the perspectival nature of historical interpretation, and the im-
possibility of historical representations being true or false in a correspondence
sense of the word continue the antifoundationalist program inaugurated by
White’s Metahistory (1973).3 Also, for understandable reasons, the secondary
literature on Ankersmit relies heavily on his English-language books and arti-
cles, despite the fact that the majority of his publications have appeared in
Dutch.4 Finally, for an author whose bibliography includes such titles as Aes-
thetic Politics (1996) and Political Representation (2002), it is remarkable that
commentators have often focused rather exclusively on his philosophy of histo-
ry, thereby implying or suggesting that his historical theory can safely be sepa-
rated from his political theory.5
If we propose a different reading of Ankersmit’s oeuvre, we do so not because
the postmodern label would be inappropriate. Apart from the fact that Ankersmit
in the late 1980s self-consciously identified as a postmodernist,6 his work unde-
1. For example, John H. Zammito, “Ankersmit’s Postmodernist Historiography: The Hyperbole of
‘Opacity,’” History and Theory 37, no. 3 (1998), 330-346; Keith Jenkins, Why History? Ethics and
Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1999), 154-155; Heikki Saari, “On Ankersmit’s Postmod-
ernist Theory of Historical Narrativity,” Rethinking History 9, no. 1 (2005), 5-21; Callum G. Brown,
Postmodernism for Historians (New York: Routledge, 2013), 147.
2. Peter Icke, Frank Ankersmit’s Lost Historical Cause (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1.
3. For example, Kalle Pihlainen, “Narrative Objectivity versus Fiction: On the Ontology of His-
torical Narratives,” Rethinking History 2, no. 1 (1998), 7-22; Ján Haluška and Juraj Šuch, “Naratívny
konštruktivizmus Haydena Whita a Franka Ankersmita,” Organon F 18 (2011), 556-559; Ewa Do-
mańska, “Frank Ankersmit: From Narrative to Experience,” Rethinking History 13, no. 2 (2009),
175-196. Other examples, in less specialized studies, include Anton Froeyman, “Virtues of Histori-
ography,” Journal of the Philosophy of History 6, no. 3 (2012), 415-431; Rolf Torstendahl, The Rise
and Propagation of Historical Professionalism (New York: Routledge, 2014), 63; Jouni-Matti
Kuukkanen, Postnarrativist Philosophy of Historiography (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015),
30-49.
4. Obviously, this applies less to Dutch-language studies, perhaps the best of which is P. B. M.
Blaas, “Op zoek naar een glimp van het verleden: de geschiedfilosofie van Frank Ankersmit,” Tijd-
schrift voor Geschiedenis 119, no. 3 (2006), 377-386.
5. Literature on Ankersmit’s political philosophy is scarce. See, however, Sofia Näsström, “Rep-
resentative Democracy as Tautology: Ankersmit and Lefort on Representation,” European Journal
of Political Theory 5, no. 3 (2006), 321-342; Quentin Skinner, “Comments on Frank Ankersmit’s
Political Representation and Political Experience: An Essay on Political Psychology,” Redescrip-
tions 12 (2008), 227-231; Raymond Geuss, “Blair, Rubbish, and the Demons of Noontide,” ibid.,
232-242.
6. F. R. Ankersmit, “Historiography and Postmodernism,” History and Theory 28, no. 2 (1989),
137-153.
niably challenges and, in some respects, tries to move beyond modernist con-
cerns about truth. It might be argued that precisely this “postmodern” stance
contributed much to Ankersmit’s high profile or, perhaps, “success” as a philos-
opher of history.7 Also, Ankersmit has always held Hayden White in high re-
gard, even though at times his disappointment outweighed his admiration. Nei-
ther do we dispute that Ankersmit’s most important work has (also) appeared in
English, so that at least a first encounter with his oeuvre does not require Dutch-
language skills.8 Finally, although we interpret Ankersmit’s notions of historical
and political representations as intimately related, it is justifiable, of course, to
examine the first without wondering how and why the author expanded his anal-
ysis into the sphere of political philosophy.
What all this consistently obscures, however, is the extent to which Anker-
smit does not resemble White, raises different questions and draws on different
sources than most self-designated “postmodernists” in historical theory,9 re-
sponds to specifically Dutch concerns that are largely unknown to his Anglo-
American interlocutors, finds himself inspired by continental European tradi-
tions that, especially in his English-language publications, he does not usually
invoke explicitly, and is as active as a public intellectual as he has been prolific
in philosophy of history. More specifically, as we shall argue in this article,
Ankersmit is deeply indebted to a historicist tradition in Friedrich Meinecke’s
sense of the word—a predominantly German tradition of historical thought that
emphasized the “uniqueness” or “distinctiveness” of every historical period.10
Relatedly, Ankersmit has been deeply influenced by a twentieth-century admir-
er of Meinecke-style historicism, his Groningen teacher Ernst Heinrich
Kossmann. Reading Ankersmit’s oeuvre against the background of Kossmann
and the historicist tradition that he and others invoked by way of an alternative
to social-scientific history as practiced in the 1970s helps explain some of the
distinct, nonpostmodern, and non-Whitean aspects of Ankersmit’s work, while
also illuminating the interdependency of his philosophies of historical and po-
7. Admirers and critics alike often focused their attention on the most “postmodern” aspects of his
work. Representative examples include Jenkins, Why History, 133-160 and Chris Lorenz, “Can
Histories Be True? Narrativism, Positivism, and the ‘Metaphorical Turn,’” History and Theory 37,
no. 3 (1998), 309-329.
8. Most English-language publications are revised and updated versions of pieces published origi-
nally in Dutch.
9. See, for example, Keith Jenkins, Re-Thinking History (London: Routledge, 1991); Alun Muns-
low, Deconstructing History (London: Routledge, 1997).
10. Ankersmit’s historicist orientation has been touched upon briefly in Zammito, “Ankersmit’s
Postmodernist Historiography,” 331-332; Jürgen Pieters, Moments of Negotiation: The New Histori-
cism of Stephen Greenblatt (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2001), 103-105; Edward
Thaden, “Historicism, N. A. Polevoi, and Rewriting Russian History,” East European Quarterly 38,
no. 3 (2004), 299.
litical representation.
In what follows, we will substantiate this claim, not by forcing each and every
element of Ankersmit’s many-faceted oeuvre into a historicist mold, but by
showing that some of the most salient aspects of Ankersmit’s work can profita-
bly be read as attempts at translating and modifying key historicist notions into
late twentieth-century categories. Also, without creating a “father myth” of the
sort that White once helped create around his teacher William J. Bossenbrook,11
we will demonstrate that Ankersmit at crucial moments in his intellectual trajec-
tory drew on texts and authors central to Kossmann’s research interests. Using
Dutch-language sources especially, including early publications that have been
largely overlooked even by Dutch commentators, we offer a much more contex-
tual reading of Ankersmit’s work than has been provided so far, in the hope of
contributing to a better-informed and more nuanced interpretation.12
THE EARLY ANKERSMIT
One useful point of entry into Ankersmit’s work is the question why the Dutch
philosopher of history ever since his earliest forays into the field has been fasci-
nated by “colligatory concepts,” “narrative substances,” or “historical represen-
tations.”13 Ankersmit’s first book, Narrative Logic (1983), offers two answers,
which can be summarized here very briefly, since they are familiar to all stu-
dents of Ankersmit’s work. First, he claimed that philosophers of history in the
analytical tradition had done much work on historical statements, but almost
totally ignored issues of historical synthesis. Second, he argued that such syn-
thetic judgments take the form of colligatory concepts. These concepts are phil-
osophically interesting because they raise a number of fundamental problems,
such as the absence of “translation rules” between historical reality and histori-
cal representation and the impossibility of determining the plausibility of narra-
tive substances with correspondence or coherence theories of truth.14 Because of
11. On which see Herman Paul, “Hayden White: The Making of a Philosopher of History,” Jour-
nal of the Philosophy of History 5, no. 1 (2011), 140-142.
12. As both of us are former students of Ankersmit, our account is likely to be colored by the years
we spent in Groningen. It is not our aim, however, to take sides in the debate surrounding Anker-
smit’s work. In particular, we make no attempt to defend Ankersmit against his critics. Here as else-
where, our goal is not to be “deferential to the master,” as David Roberts once suggested, but to
correct and supplement previous readings of an influential philosopher of history through more in-
depth contextualization than has been provided so far (pace David D. Roberts, “Possibilities in ‘a
Thoroughly Historical World’: Missing Hayden White’s Missed Connections,” History and Theory
52, no. 2 [2013], 277).
13. Ankersmit dedicated Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Language (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983) to William Henry Walsh, the theorist of colligatory concepts,
“whose ideas ‘colligate’ the essentials of this book” (v).
14. Ibid., 9.
these two claims, Narrative Logic has often been read as a contribution to ana-
lytical philosophy of history as it had developed in the English-speaking world
since the days of Carl G. Hempel. This is also how the author hoped it would be
read: he wrote the book as “analytically” as possible so as to reach an audience
of English-language philosophers of history especially.15 Narrative Logic, in
other words, was targeted at philosophers of history in the analytical tradition
such as Arthur C. Danto, whose work on “narrative sentences” provided a con-
text in which Ankersmit’s intervention could be situated.16
This, however, captures only part of why Ankersmit was intrigued by “col-
ligatory concepts.” What the analytical posing obscured was that Narrative Log-
ic, based on the author’s 1981 PhD thesis, emerged out of a European or, more
specifically, Dutch context in which analytical philosophy of history was rather
far away. This context is clearly reflected in Ankersmit’s early writings, which
include a dozen or so Dutch-language articles written between 1971 and 1981
for Groniek (a periodical published by the University of Groningen) and Bijdra-
gen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden (the primary
Dutch history journal, nowadays known as the Low Countries Historical Re-
view). These early articles, most of which are written in a far more colloquial
style than Narrative Logic, reveal a couple of additional concerns that might
help explain why the young Ankersmit was fascinated by “colligatory con-
cepts.”
The 1970s were, of course, a time in which “social-science history” achieved
its greatest triumphs, with model-builders and hypothesis-testers who claimed an
aura of scientific rationality while, in some cases, condescendingly dissociating
themselves from old-style “narrative history.” In the Netherlands, it was the his-
torian and philosopher Kees Bertels who exemplified the iconoclastic spirit of
this social-scientific avant-garde with a manifesto-like PhD dissertation (1973).
The book caused quite a stir in the Dutch historical discipline, if only because it
rejected all histoire événementielle and embraced a “structuralist” gospel bor-
rowed from Fernand Braudel, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Michel Foucault, among
others.17 It is worth remembering that this was the polarized context in which
Ankersmit finished his master’s in history (1973), began his teaching career at
15. Ewa Domańska, Encounters: Philosophy of History after Postmodernism (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1998), 71-72.
16. Arthur C. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1965); Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 36-43.
17. Kees Bertels, Geschiedenis tussen struktuur en evenement: een methodologies en wijsgerig
onderzoek (Amsterdam: Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij, 1973). For the debate, see C. M. van den
Akker, “Een knuppel in het hoenderhok der historici: de receptie van Kees Bertels’ Geschiedenis
tussen struktuur en evenement,” Ex Tempore 14, no. 3 (1995), 173-183. More context is provided in
Jo Tollebeek, “De ekster en de kooi: over het (bedrieglijke) succes van de theoretische geschiedenis
in Nederland,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 110, no. 1
(1995), 52-72.
the University of Groningen (1974), and undertook his first work in historical
theory.
Prominent among these early pieces is a review essay of Bertels’s dissertation
that one commentator has described as “sixteen pages of uncharitable sharp-
ness.”18 A major focus of Ankersmit’s criticism was Bertels’s “unsparing efforts
at being scientific.”19 For Dutch readers, this could hardly come as a surprise:
Ankersmit had ridiculed the “stupidity of a major part of the so-called scientific
approach to the past” as early as 1971.20 His complaint was that covering-law
explanations of the sort advocated by Bertels eliminate the historicity of the
past. They do so by decontextualizing causes and effects from their specific spa-
tiotemporal settings. What matters in a covering-law model is the logical con-
nection between cause and effect, not the time that passes in between, the inten-
tions of those responsible for the cause, or their second thoughts, regrets, and
doubts. Typical of covering-law explanations, then, is that they focus on the
universal (“timeless”) aspects of historical events, thereby neglecting their par-
ticular (“time-specific”) dimensions. Ankersmit referred to the latter when he
claimed that the type of understanding provided by law-like explanations elimi-
nates “the dimension of time”: “everything seems to take place in an eternal
present and the historicity of the past gets lost.”21
What made Ankersmit value “historicity”—elsewhere referred to as “unique-
ness,” “distinctiveness,” or “the peculiar character of things”—so highly? An-
kersmit’s early essays give two answers, which can be summarized in the
catchwords “freedom” and “contingency.” The first one is a version of the exis-
tentialist argument that a capacity to act in freedom is a defining feature of the
human condition (in regard to which Ankersmit preferred to take sides with
Maurice Merleau-Ponty against Jean-Paul Sartre in their debate on what it
means for human freedom to be historically situated).22 Although law-like mod-
els of explanation are not necessarily deterministic and do not exclude the possi-
bility that people act in freedom, Ankersmit argued that their preoccupation with
18. W. Otterspeer, “Ankersmit contra Bertels,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Ge-
schiedenis der Nederlanden 91, no. 1 (1976), 83.
19. F. R. Ankersmit, “Kees Bertels, Geschiedenis tussen struktuur en evenement,” Bijdragen en
Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 89, no. 3 (1974), 400.
20. Frank Ankersmit, “Geschiedenis en vrijheid,” Groniek 17/18 (1971), 243.
21. Frank Ankersmit, “Een aantal zwartgallige overpeinzingen, hoewel niet zonder alternatief,”
Groniek 22 (1972), 264.
22. Ankersmit, “Geschiedenis en vrijheid,” 242-244. For the debate between Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty, see John J. Compton, “Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Human Freedom,” in The Debate between
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, ed. Jon Stewart (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998),
176-179.
laws connecting causes and effects made this freedom anything but “percepti-
ble” or “tangible.”23 Precisely this, however, was what he regarded as necessary
for countering the hegemony of the homme machine or, more broadly, the he-
gemony of scientific modes of thinking in the modern world.24 For Ankersmit,
then, emphasizing the “uniqueness” of the past amounted to highlighting a di-
mension of freedom that he perceived as under threat in a culture dominated by
science.
If this first argument was a moral one, the second one had a political edge.
History can make people “aware of the contingent character of what has histori-
cally grown,” wrote Ankersmit in 1972.25 Precisely to the extent that history is
not depicted as a chain of causes and effects but as a drama of human decisions
with sometimes unintended consequences, it enables people to recognize that
present-day circumstances, too, are at least partly a product of human action.
This means that, if needed, they can be changed by similar human efforts. A
historiography attentive to the “uniqueness” of the past is, in other words, an
effective means for becoming aware of “what can be improved in one’s own
time.”26 If this is vaguely reminiscent of arguments for “revolution” produced by
left-wing-oriented students of Ankersmit’s generation, it should be added that
what Ankersmit wanted to see disappear was not the twentieth-century remnants
of nineteenth-century bourgeois culture, but rather “our contemporary all-
pervading rationality,” “our preference for quantitative analysis,” and “that
damned precision, accuracy to one hundred decimals after the comma (for an
error in the 99th can cost a human life).”27 What politicians and citizens need for
understanding the challenges they are facing and for distinguishing between
living and dying elements in their social and political legacies is not the newest
scientific technique, but a well-formed “historical consciousness,” or so the
twenty-seven-year old history student maintained.28
A RETRIEVAL OF HISTORICISM
Given that “historical consciousness,” or historisch besef in Dutch, was a trans-
lation of Wilhelm Dilthey’s historisches Bewußtsein, it was clear on what
23. Ankersmit, “Zwartgallige overpeinzingen,” 265.
24. Frank Ankersmit, “Antwoord aan Henk van Setten,” Groniek 19 (1971), 33.
25. Ankersmit, “Zwartgallige overpeinzingen,” 265.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 262.
28. Ankersmit had studied physics and mathematics at Leiden and Groningen before entering
Groningen’s history and philosophy programs. This may help explain the sharpness of his polemics
against “scientism” as well as his insistence that the “two cultures” are essentially different.
sources Ankersmit drew in dissociating himself from “scientific history.” He
was inspired by nineteenth-century historicism or, more precisely, by the Ger-
man tradition of thought that Friedrich Meinecke, following Dilthey, had codi-
fied as Historismus. As is well known, Meinecke had defined historicism in
terms of “development” and “individuality.”29 With the former term denoting an
organicist view of growth such as found in Leopold von Ranke, the latter term
referred to the “distinctiveness” or “uniqueness” of historical periods, such as
expressed in Ranke’s dictum that “every epoch is immediate to God.” In
Meinecke’s reading, Ranke had been convinced that this “uniqueness” of every
period, era, or epoch could be captured in a single “idea.”30 Precisely this was
what Ankersmit, in a 1980 lecture for the Netherlands Historical Society in
Utrecht, presented as a crucial insight for his own Narrative Logic. He even
framed his dissertation project as an attempt at retrieving historicism in
Meinecke’s sense.31 Given that this is not how Narrative Logic is typically
read,32 it is worth examining why Ankersmit presented himself as a neohistori-
cist.
Of course, when Ankersmit embraced a Meineckean Ideenlehre, he did so
with one major difference. Instead of assigning historians the task of identifying
characteristic ideas in historical reality, he believed that historians have to con-
strue those ideas. For reasons too familiar to be repeated here, he argued that
judgments about the characteristic features of the past are expressed through
colligatory concepts such as “Renaissance” and “Industrial Revolution,” which
are products of the historian’s imagination and serve the purpose of organizing
rather than generating knowledge of the past.33 This antirealist turn had major
29. Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (1936), ed. Carl Hinrichs (Munich: R.
Oldenbourg, 1959), 5. In 2013, Ankersmit’s last PhD student, Reinbert Krol, devoted his doctoral
dissertation to Meinecke’s understanding of historicism.
30. F. R. Ankersmit, “Een moderne verdediging van het historisme: geschiedenis en identiteit,”
Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 96, no. 3 (1981), 468. On
the historiographical question to what extent Ranke had actually subscribed to what Meinecke, fol-
lowing Johann Goldfriedrich, identified as a historicist Ideenlehre, see Günter Johannes Henz, Leo-
pold von Ranke in Geschichtsdenken und Forschung, vol. 1 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2014),
409-412.
31. Ankersmit, “Moderne verdediging,” 458. In Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Rep-
resentation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012)—a book that can plausibly be read as a
restatement of Narrative Logic—Ankersmit similarly described his aim as “an attempt to translate
the historicist theory of historical representation into a more contemporary philosophical idiom” (ix).
32. Despite the fact that Narrative Logic emphasized its “close affinity with historism as advocat-
ed by writers such as Ranke, Meinecke or Huizinga” (3) and even presented itself as “a plea for a
historist philosophy of history” (249). It should be noted that Ankersmit used “historism” here as an
equivalent to Historismus in order to avoid confusion with “historicism” of the sort Karl Popper had
famously attacked.
33. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 79-95.
implications for what historicism could be understood to mean. In Ankersmit’s
hands, historical “ideas” or “forms” (the neo-Kantian term that Ankersmit bor-
rowed from Johan Huizinga) transformed into “points of view” or “metaphors.”
Goethe’s individuum est ineffabile, which had served as an epigraph to
Meinecke’s book, became a statement about the unique features of historical
representations (“points of view are one and indivisible and there is no point of
view common to all historical points of view”).34 And the often-heard critique
that historicism in its early twentieth-century incarnation had been “quietist,”
with disastrous political consequences, all of a sudden lost its target: “As soon as
we realize that the logic and coherence of a historical study do not mirror a logic
and coherence in the past itself, but are only the result of the historian’s attempt
at writing a good and maximally consistent story, then we also have to realize
that no political assignments can be inferred from historical knowledge.”35
Why then did Ankersmit, despite these significant differences between
Meinecke’s Historismus and his own philosophy of history, choose to inscribe
himself in a historicist tradition? Three reasons can be singled out. First, histori-
cism provided an alternative to “scientific history,” not only for Ankersmit, but
also for other critics of social-scientific history. For instance, in the Dutch con-
text, Hermann von der Dunk at Utrecht University also heavily drew on histori-
cist resources.36 Because Ankersmit basically shared this strategy, he sought to
make historicism as philosophically up to date as possible. Second, as Marek
Tamm has recently pointed out, the undisputed hero of Narrative Logic was
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, whose monads resembled Ankersmit’s narrative
substances in offering irreducible interpretive perspectives on the world.37 Since
Meinecke and Ernst Cassirer, Leibniz had been interpreted as a precursor of
nineteenth-century historicism, just as the historicist tradition in turn had been
read as an “unfolding” of the monadological “idea.”38 Against this background,
it made sense for a modern monadologist to identify with Leibniz’s nineteenth-
century heirs.
Most important, however, was that Ankersmit had been trained in an academ-
ic milieu imbued with historicist sensitivities. His most influential teacher had
34. Ankersmit, “Moderne verdediging,” 468.
35. Ibid., 467. In the Dutch context, this could be read as a response to M. C. Brands, Historisme
als ideologie: het “onpolitieke” en “anti-normatieve” element in de Duitse geschiedwetenschap
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1965).
36. Herman Paul, Het moeras van de geschiedenis: Nederlandse debatten over historisme (Am-
sterdam: Bert Bakker, 2012), 232-233.
37. Frank Ankersmit and Marek Tamm, “Leibnizian Philosophy of History: A Conversation,” Re-
thinking History 20, no. 4 (2016), 491-511.
38. Meinecke, Entstehung des Historismus, 27-45; Ernst Cassirer, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1932), 306.
been Ernst Heinrich Kossmann, an aristocratically minded historian with Ger-
man family roots who had taught at University College London before moving
to Groningen in 1966.39 Pairing classic erudition to dignified irony in teaching
and writing, Kossmann embodied a professorial persona that Ankersmit, himself
from patrician descent, greatly admired.40 Notably, it was Kossmann who intro-
duced Ankersmit to the historicist tradition and, as we shall see in a moment,
stimulated his pupil in other crucial respects, too.41 The student, in turn, as early
as 1977 described his teacher’s two-volume history of the Netherlands and Bel-
gium as a brilliant specimen of “what one sometimes calls ‘colligation’” as well
as an exceptionally good example of how historians can convey a sense of free-
dom and contingency to their readers.42 “When I was reflecting on the problems
discussed in this study,” wrote Ankersmit in Narrative Logic, “it was his way of
writing history—intelligent, panoramic and penetrating—that I constantly had in
mind.”43 For Ankersmit, Kossmann would continue to embody the historical
profession at its best.44
HAYDEN WHITE
39. M. E. H. N. Mout, “Een eenvoudig historicus,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Ge-
schiedenis der Nederlanden 93 (1987), 532-536; Klaas van Berkel, “E. H. Kossmann als redacteur
van de Bijdragen en Mededelingen,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der
Nederlanden 119, no. 1 (2004), 1-9; H. L. Wesseling, “Levensbericht van Ernst Heinrich
Kossmann,” Jaarboek van de Maatschappij der Nederlandse Letterkunde te Leiden 2003-2004 (Lei-
den: Maatschappij der Nederlandse Letterkunde, 2005), 106-125; Wessel Krul, “Een traditie van
geleerdheid,” in E. H. Kossmann, Geschiedenis is als een olifant: een keuze uit het werk van E. H.
Kossmann, ed. Frank Ankersmit and Wessel Krul (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2005), 7-17.
40. Consider the following recollection from 2007: “I admired [Kossmann] a great deal, we could
get on very well with each other, though intellectually rather than personally, I should add. He had
an unusually strong and fascinating personality—I never met anyone even remotely coming close to
what he was like. Just to give you an idea: he was all that one might associate with François Guizot,
very much aloof, very intelligent, both impossible to get close to and yet very much accessible and
blessed with the rhetorical powers of a Pericles. If he had decided for a political career, the recent
history of my country would have [been] completely different from what it is now.” Marcin Mos-
kalewicz, “Sublime Experience and Politics: Interview with Professor Frank Ankersmit,” Rethinking
History 11, no. 2 (2007), 263.
41. For Kossmann’s understanding of historicism, see “Friedrich Meinecke (1862–1954),” in His-
torici van de twintigste eeuw, ed. A. H. Huussen, Jr., E. H. Kossmann, and H. Renner (Utrecht: Het
Spectrum, 1981), 11-25, and Thorbecke en het historisme (Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitge-
vers Maatschappij, 1982). Interestingly, in the second of these essays, Kossmann used Ankersmit’s
“narrative substances” as a technical term for what Johan Rudolf Thorbecke, a nineteenth-century
Dutch historicist, had understood an “epoch” to mean (54-55).
42. F. R. Ankersmit, “E. H. Kossmann, De Lage Landen, 1870-1940,” Groniek 51 (1977), 9.
43. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 5.
44. F. R. Ankersmit, “Ernst Kossmann: 31 januari 1922–8 november 2003,” in Levensberichten en
herdenkingen 2005 (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 2005),
66-76.
If this historicist orientation helps elucidate the intellectual background of Nar-
rative Logic, our follow-up argument is that historicist influences such as exert-
ed by Kossmann can also be detected in other parts of Ankersmit’s oeuvre, most
notably in the musings on historical experience and in his views on political
representation. However, before turning to these later elements, we would like to
comment briefly on the conventional view that Narrative Logic was indebted, or
even a response, to White’s Metahistory.
Ankersmit’s earliest reference to Metahistory dates from 1976 and emerged in
the context of an essay exploring the morphological similarities between histori-
cal novels and works of historical scholarship. Ankersmit’s line of reasoning in
this essay is strongly reminiscent of Metahistory: historians and novelists both
write stories, all stories are necessarily selective, and those selections are gov-
erned by criteria that are primarily stylistic ones.45 More critical commentary
followed in 1978, when Ankersmit tried to understand how tropological catego-
ries could possibly structure historical discourse, as White maintained. This
turned out to be difficult, given what Ankersmit (with a bluntness of which he
would certainly disapprove today) called “the slovenly manner in which White
exposes his ideas. His line of reasoning is often very incoherent and continuous-
ly he blurts out crass statements without even trying to justify them. Conse-
quently, next to some brilliant insights, White’s book contains much non-
sense.”46
What fascinated Ankersmit in Metahistory was the suggestion that metaphor,
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony can serve as forms of intuition or categories
of understanding in the Kantian sense. But was this White’s idea or an implica-
tion drawn from Ankersmit’s own assumption that historical theorists are phi-
losophers trying to answer epistemological questions? Given that White, in
Ankersmit’s assessment, presented his theory of tropes with “a nonchalance
that closely approaches the limits of what is permissible,” Ankersmit said he
did not know for sure whether the tropes were indeed supposed to structure
historical data into narrative substances.47 And assuming they were, why were
there only four of them? “A ‘transcendental deduction,’ to remain in Kantian
style, is entirely absent,” Ankersmit complained. “[W]ithout further explana-
tion, the figures of speech come out of the blue.”48 Clearly this criticism reveals
the high expectations that Ankersmit had held of White, just as his later disap-
pointment in Richard Rorty would demonstrate how eagerly Ankersmit had
45. F. R. Ankersmit, “De historiografie en de historische roman,” Groniek 47 (1976), 11-19.
46. F. R. Ankersmit, “Het narratieve element in de geschiedschrijving,” Tijdschrift voor Geschie-
denis 91, no. 2 (1978), 202.
47. Ibid., 211.
48. Ibid.
wished the author of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) to discover
the importance of aesthetic experience in the wake of his deconstruction of lan-
guage as an epistemological foundation.49
This frustration was one reason why White ended up playing a marginal role
in Narrative Logic compared to, for example, Leibniz, G. W. F. Hegel, Bertrand
Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Karl Popper. Another, more important reason
was that Ankersmit’s aim to develop a neohistoricist philosophy of history in an
analytical idiom was too different from White’s to benefit from Metahistory: the
book just was not philosophical enough. These two reasons help explain why, in
1979, Ankersmit managed to write an article on the emergence of “narrativism”
in Anglo-American philosophy of history in which White’s name occurred only
once, in passing.50 For Ankersmit, “narrativism” was a philosophical position
represented not primarily by White, but by Peter Munz, whose book, The Shapes
of Time (1977), he lauded as one of the most important recent publications in
philosophy of history.51 Consequently, it was Munz, together with Haskell Fain,
the author of Between Philosophy and History (1970), who was Ankersmit’s
main American conversation partner in the years when Narrative Logic took
shape.52
The impact of Metahistory on Narrative Logic should therefore not be overes-
timated. In the light of Ankersmit’s Groningen context as well as his early publi-
cations, it makes more sense to read his first book as an attempt at retrieving a
German historicist tradition. This is not to say, of course, that White could not
have provided inspiration for this project. If Ankersmit had read Metahistory, as
it can plausibly be read, as a call for liberation from the cage of scientific ration-
ality or as a manifest for counter-Enlightenment ideals of the sort embodied by
Giambattista Vico,53 his response might have been different. Also, if White, the
existentialist-inspired humanist, had known that Ankersmit’s narrative substances
emerged at least in part out of concern over human freedom and the contingency
49. F. R. Ankersmit, Sublime Historical Experience (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005),
66-67. As Michael S. Roth rightly observes, Ankersmit wrote here “in the mode of a disappointed
colleague” (Michael S. Roth, “Ebb Tide,” History and Theory 46, no. 1 [2007], 67).
50. F. R. Ankersmit, “Een nieuwe synthese? Recente ontwikkelingen in de Angelsaksische ge-
schiedfilosofie,” Theoretische Geschiedenis 6, no. 1 (1979), 64.
51. Ibid., 63.
52. F. R. Ankersmit, “Eloge van de cultuurgeschiedenis,” Groniek 53/54 (1977), 4-10.
53. See Herman Paul, Hayden White: The Historical Imagination (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press,
2011), 57-81, and “An Ironic Battle against Irony: Epistemological and Ideological Irony in Hayden
White’s Philosophy of History, 1955–1973,” in Tropes for the Past: Hayden White and the Histo-
ry/Literature Debate, ed. Kuisma Korhonen (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006), 35-44. For White’s rela-
tion to historicism, see Herman Paul, “Hayden White and the Crisis of Historicism,” in Re-Figuring
Hayden White, ed. Frank Ankersmit, Ewa Domańska, and Hans Kellner (Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 2009), 54-73.
of the sociopolitical order, it is possible that his review of Narrative Logic in The
American Historical Review would have been more enthusiastic.54 But this is
counterfactual history. In reality, Ankersmit would continue to treat White as a
“new neo-Kantian,” whose tropology tried to do for history what Kant’s An-
schauungsformen and reine Verstandesbegriffe had done for epistemology.55
HUIZINGA’S HISTORICAL SENSATION
Assuming that our interpretation of Ankersmit’s retrieval of historicism makes
sense, then the follow-up question is to what extent this motive of retrieval can
also shed some light on the most contested element of Ankersmit’s oeuvre: his
philosophy of (sublime) historical experience, such as presented programmati-
cally in his 1993 inaugural address. Right from the beginning, critics have been
bewildered and annoyed by what seemed an outright rejection of the “represen-
tational” philosophy of Narrrative Logic.56 Outside the Netherlands, this criti-
cism emerged in particular after Sublime Historical Experience (2005), the
much-delayed, book-length elaboration of the Groningen inaugural. In History
and Theory, Michael Roth wondered how the once “mighty contributor to post-
modern history and theory” could have become so naïve as to believe in the pos-
sibility of experience unmediated by language.57 Peter Icke even goes so far as
to contrast the “good Ankersmit” of Narrative Logic to the not so good Anker-
smit of Sublime Historical Experience, who, despite his earlier commitment to
the linguistic turn, “steered himself into an ‘experiential’ cul-de-sac.”58 Could
Ankersmit’s neohistoricism help explain this counterintuitive move?
Ankersmit himself has framed his philosophy of historical experience as a re-
sponse to the then-popular genre of micro-stories. For Ankersmit, studies like
Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s Montaillou (1975) and Carlo Ginzburg’s Il
formaggio e i vermi (1976) seemed “at odds with all that I had been saying
about the nature and purpose of historical writing,” given that they zoomed in on
details of everyday life instead of engaging in configurational comprehension. “I
54. Hayden White, review of Narrative Logic by F. R. Ankersmit, The American Historical Re-
view 89, no. 4 (1984), 1037-1038.
55. Frank Ankersmit, “White’s ‘New Neo-Kantianism,’” in Ankersmit, Domańska, and Kellner,
eds., Re-Figuring Hayden White, 36-37.
56. Lodi Nauta, “Een postmodern levensgevoel: Ankersmit over de historische ervaring,” Theore-
tische Geschiedenis 20, no. 3 (1993), 283-290. See also the subsequent exchange: F. R. Ankersmit,
“Antwoord aan Nauta,” Theoretische Geschiedenis 20, no. 4 (1993), 523-533; Lodi Nauta, “Weer-
woord op Ankersmit,” Theoretische Geschiedenis 20, no. 4 (1993), 534-537.
57. Roth, “Ebb Tide,” 66, 68.
58. Icke, Ankersmit’s Lost Historical Cause, 8, 104. See also Harold Mah’s devastating critique in
“The Predicament of Experience,” Modern Intellectual History 5, no. 1 (2008), 97-119.
retained from it,” says Ankersmit, “a fascination for the issue of experience ver-
sus language.”59 In this reading, Ankersmit’s inaugural of 1993 was a natural
follow-up to a notorious paper delivered in Utrecht in 1986, in which Ankersmit
had claimed that a postmodern autumn wind had begun to blow through Western
historical studies, causing the leaves to fall off the tree. “What remains now for
Western historiography is to gather the leaves that have been blown away and to
study them independently of their origins.”60 That is to say that, for Ankersmit, a
desire to grasp as concretely as possible how life in the past had felt was going
to replace the historian’s traditional task of showing patterns across time and
space. And if that was the case, Narrative Logic had to be supplemented, if not
with an Experiential Logic, then at least with a philosophical account of whether
and how the past can be experienced in its vivid concreteness.61
Arguably, however, this is not the whole story: other factors also contributed
to Ankersmit’s interest in historical experience.62 Also, by contrasting “represen-
tation” and “experience,” Ankersmit’s autobiographical account obscures the
parallels or analogies that existed between his neohistoricism and his philosophy
of historical experience. Perhaps the most important of these analogies is that
both were attempts at reformulating an early twentieth-century idea in late twen-
tieth-century categories. Whereas Narrative Logic sought to revive Meinecke-
style historicism, De historische ervaring (1993) aimed at a retrieval of what
Johan Huizinga in 1920 had called the “historical sensation.” This phrase re-
ferred to an experience of “direct contact with the past,” typically evoked by
relatively trivial relics such as a drawing or a notarial charter. In all their sim-
plicity, such relics are capable of bringing about an effet de réel: they seem to
reveal the “the essence of things,” or disclose what the past really looked like.63
Ankersmit’s interest in Huizinga’s fin de siècle sensitivism emerged in a con-
59. Frank R. Ankersmit, “Invitation to Historians,” Rethinking History 7, no. 3 (2003), 427, 428.
60. Ankersmit, “Historiography and Postmodernism,” 150. This essay originally appeared in
Dutch as “Tegen de verwetenschappelijking van de geschiedbeoefening,” in Balans en perspectief:
visies op de geschiedwetenschap in Nederland, ed. F. van Besouw et al. (Groningen: Wolters-
Noordhoff/Forsten, 1987), 55-72. Tollebeek describes the impact of the Utrecht lecture in “De ekster
en de kooi,” 59-60.
61. See Ankersmit’s retrospective in Frank Ankersmit and Jonathan Menezes, “Historical Experi-
ence Interrogated: A Conversation,” Journal of the Philosophy of History 11, no. 2 (2017), 247-273.
62. Not the least important of these was a personal one. Sublime Historical Experience abounds
with autobiographical stories about the boredom Ankersmit experienced as a child (286), his love of
rococo decoration (297), and the transference of personal feelings of loss to the trauma of the French
Revolution (442). Ankersmit, in other words, not only theorized “historical sensation”; he knew it
first-hand.
63. J. Huizinga, “Het historisch museum,” De Gids 84, no. 1 (1920), 251-262. For an excellent
discussion, see W. E. Krul, “Huizinga’s definitie van de geschiedenis,” in Johan Huizinga, De taak
der cultuurgeschiedenis, ed. W. E. Krul (Groningen: Historische Uitgeverij, 1995), esp. 270-276.
text where Huizinga’s name was on virtually everyone’s lips. In 1972,
Kossmann had organized a five-day Huizinga conference in Groningen,64 which
has been interpreted retrospectively as the start of a “Huizinga revival” that last-
ed throughout the 1980s and 1990s.65 Indicative for this revival were no fewer
than four PhD dissertations devoted to Huizinga, the first of which was written
under Kossmann’s supervision, and the publication of a three-volume edition of
Huizinga’s correspondence.66 Although this revival was driven by various mo-
tives, most of the scholars engaged in it paired clear anti-social-scientific atti-
tudes to slightly nostalgic appreciations for literary style, high culture, and
Humboldtian Bildung. This was especially evident in a book-length essay (1992)
by two young Belgian historians, Jo Tollebeek and Tom Verschaffel, who made
a passionate plea for “historical sensation” as the pulsating heart of historical
studies. They argued that the foreignness of the past in which historians claim to
be interested is nowhere as tangible as in relics from the past—letters, pieces of
furniture, works of art—which confront present-day observers with a world dif-
ferent from theirs. The enchantment emanating from such relics elicits a desire
for knowledge, which in turn is the best possible stimulus for historical inquiry.
Huizinga’s “historical sensation,” then, is not incompatible with scholarly re-
search, but the driving force behind it.67 Among Dutch historians in the early
1990s, this argument received enough attention for a skeptical reviewer to be-
moan that “a ghost roams through Dutch historical studies: the ghost of the his-
torical sensation.”68
Meanwhile, Ankersmit had been studying Ernst Gombrich’s “Meditations on
a Hobby Horse” (1951) and Danto’s The Transfiguration of the Commonplace
(1983)—two texts to which he had turned in an attempt at extending his concept
of historical representation to the political sphere (on which more below). The
notions of aesthetic representation developed in these seminal studies made such
64. E. H. Kossmann, Familiearchief: notities over voorouders, tijdgenoten en mijzelf (Amsterdam:
Bert Bakker, 1998), 177-181.
65. Van Berkel, “E. H. Kossmann,” 8; Christopher Strupp, Johan Huizinga: Geschichtswissen-
schaft als Kulturgeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 12, 15.
66. W. E. Krul, Historicus tegen de tijd: opstellen over leven en werk van J. Huizinga (Groningen:
Historische Uitgeverij, 1990); Mark Kuiper, De vaas van Huizinga: over geschiedenis, verhaal en de
betekenis van de dingen die voorbij gingen (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1993); Léon Hanssen, Hui-
zinga en de troost van de geschiedenis: verbeelding en rede (Amsterdam: Balans, 1996); Anton van
der Lem, Het eeuwige verbeeld in een afgehaald bed: Huizinga en de Nederlandse beschaving (Am-
sterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 1997); J. Huizinga, Briefwisseling, ed. León Hanssen, W. E. Krul, and
Anton van der Lem, 3 vols. (Utrecht: Veen, 1989–1991).
67. Jo Tollebeek and Tom Verschaffel, De vreugden van Houssaye: apologie van de historische
interesse (Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 1992).
68. Barbara Henkes, “De a-historische sensatie van Tollebeek en Verschaffel,” Leidschrift 9, no. 3
(1993), 137.
a deep impression on Ankersmit that he drew on them in virtually all of his work
of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Gombrich and Danto not only rejected mimet-
ic theories of representation, as Ankersmit had done in Narrative Logic, but al-
so, each in his own way, proposed a substitution theory according to which, in
Danto’s words, the value of art is “logically tied up with putting reality at a dis-
tance.”69 In this line of reasoning, resemblance between art and reality is not
what matters, but a difference that enables one to look with fresh eyes at the
world, or even to see the world at all.70 When, from the late 1980s onwards, An-
kersmit characterized his philosophy as “aesthetic,” he often did this specifically
to emphasize that representations are like works of art, the value of which lies
primarily in their difference from reality.71 This implied, among other things,
that historical representations cannot be expected to rely on self-images circulat-
ing at the time. If their function is to “transfigure the commonplace,” as Danto
put it, then it makes more sense for them to draw attention to “what a period has
not said about itself” or to tiny, “commonplace” details that, from a hindsight
point of view, turn out to embody defining features of the past under discus-
sion.72 And precisely that is what Huizinga seemed to hint at with his historical
sensation.
Against this twofold background, then, Ankersmit’s inaugural address can be
read as a response to the Dutch Huizinga revival, as an attempt to explain how
historians identify what is peculiar about the past in comparison to the present,
but also as an exploration of a hitherto neglected aspect of what Huizinga in his
own inaugural, back in 1905, had called “the aesthetic element in historical
thought.”73 In other words, while reading Huizinga in the context of studying
Gombrich, Danto, and Nelson Goodman, Ankersmit recognized that the aesthet-
ics of history also includes a dimension of what Huizinga had called “sensa-
tion”—something close to the heart of the antique collector, admirer of rococo,
and devotee of eighteenth-century music that was, and is, Ankersmit.74 Defining
69. Arthur C. Danto, “Artworks and Real Things,” Theoria 39, no. 1-3 (1973), 2.
70. F. R. Ankersmit, “Historical Representation,” History and Theory 27, no. 3 (1988), 219.
71. For example, F. R. Ankersmit, De macht van representatie (Kampen: Kok Agora, 1996), 10-
11; Macht door representatie (Kampen: Kok Agora, 1997), 14-18, 148-151, 154-157.
72. Ankersmit, “Historiography and Postmodernism,” 146.
73. J. Huizinga, Het aesthetische bestanddeel van geschiedkundige voorstellingen (Haarlem: H. D.
Tjeenk Willink, 1905).
74. Ankersmit, Macht van representatie, 10, 173-175, 243-243. Few journalists who have inter-
viewed Ankersmit at home have been able to resist the temptation of describing his richly furnished
study in terms of the trope of a “different world” (as employed by Machiavelli in his famous 1513
letter to Francesco Vettori). “A visitor to Ankersmit’s home enters a different world. The color of the
interior hovers between golden yellow and wine red. The furnishing reminds one of a salon in En-
lightenment Paris, where Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau met each other. Their absence is compen-
sated by an immense number of books. Politicians, historians, theologians, sages, thinkers, and
and defending this “historical sensation” in modern philosophical terms became
Ankersmit’s main project in the years between 1993 and 2005.75
Our point here is not that Huizinga’s historical sensation was as typically his-
toricist as the “historical ideas” that Narrative Logic sought to revive. Conse-
quently, Ankersmit’s sublime historical experience did not have as distinctly a
neohistoricist profile as narrative substances or historical representations. Strik-
ingly similar, however, was the mode of retrieval: Ankersmit’s attempt to trans-
late and modify an early twentieth-century idea into late twentieth-century cate-
gories. When he brought an “updated” version of Huizinga’s historical sensation
into critical conversation with “transcendentalism, textualism, lingualism, semi-
otics, Wirkungsgeschichte, and narrativism,” his hermeneutic strategy was iden-
tical to the one we encountered in Narrative Logic.76
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
Meanwhile, Ankersmit had taken his first steps into the field of political theory,
thereby fulfilling a long-cherished hope of Kossmann. As Ankersmit explained
in a 2007 interview, his former teacher had “very much wanted me to continue
his interests and to start doing political theory as well. So he was deeply disap-
pointed by my choice for philosophy of history.”77 Yet, as early as 1974, Anker-
thinkers over thinkers from the past ten centuries have gathered here in great numbers. At night, they
enter into debate with each other; at daytime with their owner.” Luc Panhuysen, “’Het verleden laat
zich niet kennen’: Frank Ankersmit ziet in mensen die alles dreigen te verliezen de beste historici,”
NRC Handelsblad (October 8, 2005).
75. Although this project has sometimes been interpreted as “a radical departure from his previous
language-governed, representationalist style of historical theory of the kind defended in Narrative
Logic” (Icke, Ankersmit’s Lost Historical Cause, 67), Ankersmit himself emphasized, and would
continue to emphasize, that representation and experience are different things. Just as he perceived
his theory of representation as “a supplement to what was said in the 1950s and 1960s about the truth
of statements about the past or about causal explanation and not a replacement of it,” so he intended
his exploration of the question “What makes us aware of the past at all?” to augment rather than
replace his views on representation. In his own words: “I most emphatically insist that this is a book
about sublime historical experience—and not about anything else (such as historical explanation,
causality, narrative, or representation). This book is therefore not to be interpreted as a recantation of
what I have said about such other topics in my previous writings.” Ankersmit, Sublime Historical
Experience, xiv, 14.
76. F. R. Ankersmit, De historische ervaring (Groningen: Historische Uitgeverij, 1993), 25. Note
also that the idiom changed from “sensation” to “sublime” and “trauma”—categories that by the
1990s were receiving increasing amounts of attention and therefore better served Ankersmit’s pur-
pose. See F. R. Ankersmit, “Trauma als bron van historisch besef,” Feit en Fictie 4, no. 3 (1999), 7-
17; Ankersmit, Macht van representatie, 234-243.
77. Moskalewicz, “Sublime Experience,” 263.
smit had been teaching a course on political theory.78 In 1981, no fewer than five
of the thirteen “propositions” added to his PhD dissertation had addressed politi-
cal issues. It would take until 1987, though, before Ankersmit wrote his first
paper on political representation, on the not altogether surprising occasion of a
conference marking Kossmann’s retirement. Drawing, once again, on Gombrich,
Goodman, and Danto, Ankersmit argued that there is an analogy between politi-
cal representation and historical representation that can best be understood in
aesthetic terms—that is, in terms of Gombrich’s and Danto’s substitution theory
of art.79 Political representation, too, requires differences instead of similarity
between represented and representation. Parliamentarians and their electorate
are separated by what Ankersmit could later call an “aesthetic gap,” which guar-
antees the politician’s freedom to make electorally unfavorable judgments and
decisions.80 Just as historical representations cannot be reduced to historical
statements, so political judgment, in Ankersmit’s analysis, is more than the sum
of electoral preferences. Ankersmit’s paper thus defended the politician’s free
mandate over against a view “that would reduce the representative to a mailbox”
for voters to submit their petitions.81
Interestingly, Ankersmit perceived such “mailbox” theories of political repre-
sentation as widespread, if not among political philosophers, then at least in polit-
ical reality: “It is particularly difficult for us to say goodbye to such mimetic con-
ceptions.”82 For Ankersmit, this was caused by the near-ineradicable expectation
that voters and parliamentarians have something in common—an ideology, a
tradition, or a distinctive belief in austerity—that enables them to agree on prob-
lem definitions and solution strategies. In Gombrich’s and Rorty’s technical lan-
guage, such shared horizons serve as tertia comparationis, or as orders shared by
represented and representatives alike. Historically speaking, virtually all political
philosophy, from neo-Stoic natural law to modern free-market capitalism, had
operated on the assumption of such tertia. This made aesthetic representation in
politicis a rather revolutionary idea. If mimetic theories of representation make
way for substitution theories, the implication is that all “sharedness” between
politicians and electorate is redundant or even counterproductive.83 Ankersmit
78. “Overzicht themagroepen 1974/1975,” Groniek 33 (1974), 430-431.
79. F. R. Ankersmit, “Politieke representatie: betoog over de esthetische staat,” Bijdragen en Me-
dedelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 102, no. 3 (1987), 371-376.
80. F. R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy beyond Fact and Value (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1996), 18.
81. Ankersmit, “Politieke representatie,” 370.
82. Ibid., 367.
83. Although in later writings, Ankersmit would allow more space for ideologies, which by then
he would define in terms of ad hoc, metaphorical, nonmetaphysical “points of view,” this would not
detract from his rejection of a priori ideologies. See Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics, 357, and “De
thus put all his cards on the politicians’ powers of judgment. Within the period of
their mandate, politicians are as free in exercising these powers as historians are
in developing new colligatory concepts.84
Although the 1987 lecture abounded with examples from early modern neo-
Stoic natural-law philosophy—one of Kossmann’s fields of expertise—
Ankersmit did not hide that his real target was the evil known as “bureaucracy.”
Ever-expanding government apparatuses producing ever more detailed codes
and regulations are a true sign that the state is being absorbed by society. In such
bureaucratic contexts, “every wrinkle at the surface of society” is supposed to
have political implications, with the effect of political decision-making becom-
ing truly mimetic.85 Ankersmit’s remedy, presented in a quasi-Freudian one-
liner, reads like a summary of his political philosophy: “Where bureaucracy is,
representation must come.”86 Or more abstractly: Where tertia comparationis
reign supreme, aesthetic reorientation is needed. For Ankersmit, liberation must
indeed come from aesthetics, given that only aesthetics is able to resist the temp-
tation of invoking timeless truths or universal schemes (a temptation to which
Ankersmit, drawing on his old antipathy, believed social scientists especially
susceptible). Aesthetics is the art of finding unique solutions to unique prob-
lems.87
A good politician, then, does not rely on social-scientific expertise or on ethi-
cal or metaphysical doctrines. In the Dutch context, this meant that Ankersmit
dissociated himself simultaneously from a “pillarized” (verzuild) political sys-
tem dominated by confessional parties as well as from “social and cultural plan-
ning” of the kind practiced widely since the Second World War.88 A good politi-
cian instead is an independent thinker, able to surprise his or her voters with
unexpected analyses and original viewpoints. A politician is like an artist, then,
who does not need ethical arguments or epistemic expertise to make people per-
ceive their world differently. Ankersmit thus transposed Danto’s notion of artis-
tic style into the political realm.89 Aesthetic politics is a politics of style, “be-
hedendaagse politieke partij: van representatie van de kiezer naar zelfrepresentatie,” in DNPP Jaar-
boek 2001 (Groningen: Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, 2001), 15-17.
84. F. R. Ankersmit, De spiegel van het verleden (Kampen: Kok Agora, 1996), 270-271. Charac-
teristically, Ankersmit seldom felt a need to elaborate on the limits of this freedom.
85. Ankersmit, “Politieke representatie,” 377.
86. Ibid., 378.
87. Ibid.; Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics, 76.
88. On the latter, see Jan Willem Duyvendak, De planning van ontplooiing: wetenschap, politiek
en de maakbare samenleving (The Hague: Sdu, 1999).
89. Ankersmit, “Politieke representatie,” 374.
yond fact and value.”90
What this implied for political practice became apparent in 2001, when the
right-wing dandy Pim Fortuyn appeared on the Dutch political stage, not only
with viewpoints that were widely perceived as politically incorrect, but also with
a style of self-presentation that made the entire intellectual establishment in the
Netherlands grumble about “populism.”91 Ankersmit, however, though not ap-
proving Fortuyn’s ideas, praised the newcomer for his radiant style and dis-
missive attitude toward political correctness. Moreover, invoking one of his fa-
vorite themes, he believed Fortuyn to be able to reclaim some of the space that
parliament had lost to bureaucrats, judging, for example, by his sovereign indif-
ference to “scientific” reports of the sort issued by the Bureau for Economic
Policy Analysis (CPB).92 Instead of seeking truth, Fortuyn, in Ankersmit’s opti-
mistic assessment, tried to practice aesthetic politics. He did not rely on neo-
Stoic tertia, but promised to become a truly Machiavellian conflict negotiator.93
(Yet, whereas Machiavelli, back in 1527, had died peacefully in bed, Fortuyn
was assassinated just days before the parliamentary elections in 2002—a politi-
cal murder that did not fail to leave a deep imprint on Dutch political culture.)94
THE MACHIAVELLIAN TRADITION
Invoking Machiavelli is unavoidable in addressing the question to what extent
Ankersmit’s political philosophy, just like his philosophy of history, can be said
to draw on historicist sources. Although Kossmann’s influence on Ankersmit’s
political theory is not difficult to detect, it is perhaps less evident that the latter is
also permeated with historicist affinities. Yet, in his 1987 lecture as well as on
many later occasions, Ankersmit consistently emphasized the intellectual affini-
90. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics, 157-158; Ankersmit, Political Representation (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2002), 147-159.
91. Jasper Camiel Muis, “Pim Fortuyn: The Evolution of a Media Phenomenon,” PhD thesis, Free
University Amsterdam, 2012.
92. Already in the late 1990s, Ankersmit had lamented that Dutch politics had become a “govern-
mental Augean stable,” due mainly to politicians who did not see any harm in outsourcing political
discernment and judgment to bureaucrats and scientific experts. “Our problem is . . . a chaotic, autis-
tic, bungling, brainless, and headstrong state—a state that knows too much about little and too little
about much to be capable of meaningful political action.” F. R. Ankersmit, “Geef koningin meer
invloed,” NRC Handelsblad (November 11, 1997). See also Hans Goslinga and Marcel ten Hooven,
“Ankersmit: kloof tussen kiezers en politici moet juist groter,” Trouw (April 3, 1996).
93. F. R. Ankersmit, “Fortuyn product van verveling: de balans van Paars,” NRC Handelsblad
(March 29, 2002); “Nooit meer politieke correctheid,” Trouw (May 11, 2002).
94. In theory, aesthetic politics in Ankersmit’s definition has no specific inclination toward ex-
treme positions on the right–left spectrum. To the contrary: Ankersmit admires juste milieu politics
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ties between aesthetic political representation and Meinecke-style historicism.95
For him, the most recognizable link between the two was provided by Machia-
velli, who in Ankersmit’s reading had rejected all tertia (Christian ethics in par-
ticular) in favor of ad hoc political judgment as the only effective guide in an
arena characterized by perennial disagreement. Instead of assuming that princes
and their subjects have common interests or share a set of moral or religious
principles, Machiavelli had emphasized the need for rulers to make up their own
minds and judge for themselves what sort of interventions are advantageous in
current circumstances. Situating his work in “the Machiavellian tradition,” as
Ankersmit did in 1987, was therefore a way of emphasizing that political insight
depends more on grasping the distinctiveness of the present moment than on
applying timeless principles to ever-new cases.96
The link between historicism and Machiavellian raison d’état thinking be-
came more explicit when Ankersmit in several later publications compared the
Renaissance thinker to Leopold von Ranke. “Both share a rejection of the clear
and transparent world of moral argument, both recognize the ever-present di-
mension of the unintended consequences of all human action . . .”97 Or as Politi-
cal Representation made the argument more elaborately:
The two are linked by an awareness of the specific individual nature of a state, nation, or
institution. Political action as dictated by raison d’état required of the statesman a recog-
nition of the historical, statistical facts under which he has to act. And the historicist’s
demand that the action of historical agents must be understood against the background of
existing historical realities is based on a similar argument. . . . The Machiavellianist doc-
trine that objective historical circumstances necessitate the statesman to act in a certain
way underlies both raison d’état thinking and historicism.98
Ankersmit even went so far as to portray Ranke as an intellectual successor to
Machiavelli.99 His favorite proof text, cited on various occasions, was Ranke’s
1836 inaugural address, which claimed that it is “the task of history to extract
from past events the nature of the state and to bring us an understanding of it;
the task of politics, to carry on and develop it after recognition and understand-
ing are sufficiently achieved.”100 For Ankersmit, the historicist cum Machiavel-
95. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics, 15, 212, 321-322, 326, 375-376; Macht door representatie, 21,
38-43, 52-57, 117-118, 211; Political Representation, 16-17, 47-50, 222-226.
96. Ankersmit, “Politieke representatie,” 379. See also Ankersmit, Macht door representatie, 169-
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ethiek,” De Groene Amsterdammer 137, no. 48 (2013), 36-39.
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99. Ibid., 8, 32.
100. Leopold von Ranke, “On the Relation of and Distinction between History and Politics”
(1836), in The Theory and Practice of History, ed. Georg G. Iggers (London: Routledge, 2011), 80,
lian political theorist, then, history and politics were closely related, not just
because politicians in the absence of tertia comparationis have no other guide to
the future than historical insight, but also because representation in both areas
requires prudentia: the virtue of judging what is appropriate in a given con-
text.101
All this, of course, echoed Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschich-
te (1924), in which Meinecke had depicted Ranke as a true representative of the
Machiavellian tradition, given that Ranke, some reservations and objections to
the Italian thinker notwithstanding, had charged politicians as unambiguously as
Machiavelli had done with the task of advancing the “egoistic” interests of the
state.102 In Meinecke’s spirit, though more straightforwardly than Meinecke
himself had done, Ankersmit also emphasized that Machiavelli had anticipated a
historicist conception of history, attributing to Machiavelli and Francesco Guic-
ciardini nothing less than “the birth of modern historical consciousness.”103 An-
kersmit thus read Machiavelli through a Meineckean lens, just as he read Ranke
through the prism of Die Entstehung des Historismus (1936).104 This illustrates
once again how important historicist resources were for the development of An-
kersmit’s thought. Primary conversation partners for his political theory did not
include contemporary theorists such as John Rawls or Jürgen Habermas. Anker-
smit’s “social imaginary,” to borrow a Taylorian expression, was shaped first
and foremost by a historicist tradition, the need for revival of which constitutes a
Leitmotiv in Ankersmit’s oeuvre.
PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL
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Is there a sense, finally, in which historical and political representation in An-
kersmit’s world not only resemble each other theoretically, but also practically
come together in narrative substances that interpret the present moment in his-
torical terms, thereby simultaneously “understanding the nature of the state” and
suggesting a course for further “development” in Ranke’s sense of the word?
More simply put, has Ankersmit, the theorist of historical and political represen-
tation, ever felt a need to practice what he preached and tried to shed historical
light on the political dilemmas of the present?
Few Dutch newspaper readers will have trouble answering this question.
Since the 1990s, Ankersmit has written hundreds of op-ed pieces on current po-
litical affairs. He was an active member of the People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy (VVD) from 2000 and caused some commotion when he left this
liberal party out of frustration over its neoliberalism and failure to provide an
adequate answer to the economic crisis of 2008.105 Before leaving the VVD, he
had been involved in drafting its “Liberal Manifesto” (2005)—a think piece with
strong antibureaucratic leanings and, not coincidentally, an epigraph borrowed
from Huizinga.106 Moreover, in 2006, he had been part of a government commit-
tee charged with offering suggestions for improvement of the Dutch parliamen-
tary system—a task that seemed to offer Ankersmit a chance to translate his
political theory into practice, but ended in disappointment when, for various
political reasons, the committee’s report ended up in a drawer.107 If all this does
not make Ankersmit a “political professor” of the sort known in nineteenth-
century Germany108—he never assumed political responsibilities, despite candi-
dacies for the newly founded Liberal Democratic Party in 2012 and the even
newer Forum for Democracy in 2016—it does make him a “public intellectual”
in Richard Posner’s sense of the word: someone who “expresses himself in a
way that is accessible to the public, and the focus of his expression is on matters
of general public concern of (or inflected by) a political or ideological cast.”109
105. “Voor de neoliberaal is het algemeen belang onzin, voor de liberaal is het juist de kern,” NRC
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(February 27, 2009).
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107. R. J. Hoekstra et al., Hart voor de publieke zaak: aanbevelingen van de Nationale Conventie
voor de 21e eeuw (The Hague: Nationale Conventie, 2006).
108. Ulrich Muhlack, “Der ‘politische Professor’ im Deutschland des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in Mate-
rialität des Geistes: Zur Sache Kultur: Im Diskurs mit Ulrich Oevermann, ed. Ronald Burkholz,
Christel Gärtner, and Ferdinand Zehentreiter (Weilerswist: Velbrück, 2001), 185-204; Niklas Len-
hard-Schramm, Konstrukteure der Nation: Geschichtsprofessoren als politische Akteure in Vormärz
und Revolution 1848/49 (Munster: Waxmann, 2014), 59-77.
109. Richard A. Posner, Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2003), 35. This definition has not gone uncontested, though: Stefan Collini, Absent
Minds: Intellectuals in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 241.
In light of the foregoing, it will come as no surprise that Ankersmit’s gravest
cause of concern, judging by his op-ed interventions, was the “managerial” style
generally adopted by modern politicians.110 This “managerialism” did not in-
clude just bureaucracy or reliance on scientific expertise. From the late 1990s
onwards, Ankersmit objected in particular to the proliferation of so-called
“quangos”—quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations to which gov-
ernments seemed happy to “outsource” significant parts of their responsibilities,
power, and budget. By 2004, the Dutch government alone had helped to create
no fewer than 3,200 such quasi-privatized government bodies, which employed
more civil servants than all ministerial departments together.111 From a manage-
rial point of view, such quangos have the advantage of being more effective than
traditional government bodies, because they are not subjected to traditional par-
liamentary oversight. But this, wrote an indignant Ankersmit in countless op-ed
pieces, is their fundamental problem as well: they defy democratic control and
drastically confine traditional government authority. Especially in situations of
conflict, parliament is nearly powerless against such quasi-autonomous bodies
as the Cadaster, the Dutch Healthcare Authority, the Authority for Consumers
and Markets, and the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers.112
Consistent with his view that historical representations interpret the past
through the prism of a single metaphor (“Renaissance,” “waning of the Middle
Ages”),113 Ankersmit sought and found an image conveying the essentials of his
criticism. The metaphor, introduced as early as 1997,114 was that of a “quasi-
feudal archipelago of selfish managerial islands,” created by a “re-feudalization
of public government.”115 Situated in the no-man’s land between state and socie-
ty, quangos resemble feudal land grants in that they cut political authority into
countless pieces, thereby obstructing political accountability. Thus, whereas pri-
vatization tended to be justified in terms of “modernization,” Ankersmit by con-
trast perceived it as “a reintroduction of a government logic the shortcomings of
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which were clear by 1500.”116 Or as he put it in a 2005 interview: “A re-
feudalization of public administration has taken place. Just as back then, in the
absolute monarchy, feudal lords effectively had a decisive say, so today [politi-
cal] authority has been divided over all sorts of organizations and bureaucracies.
It has been transferred to Europe, to departmental apparatuses, to judicial powers,
and especially to independent governing bodies.”117
Since 2005, Ankersmit has been further developing this re-feudalization the-
sis, most notably in a book manuscript provisionally entitled De nieuwe Mid-
deleeuwen (The New Middle Ages).118 Remarkable about this book is that its
historical and political analyses are hard to distinguish and that its central
claim—neoliberal privatization of government functions amounts to a return to
feudal forms of rule—is a historical representation as much as a political one.
On the one hand, this is to say that Ankersmit, more than in any of his previous
books, engages in historical research so as to substantiate his analogy between
medieval feudal rule and contemporary political practice. On the other hand, the
political implications of this analogy are hard to miss. If democracy is worth
defending, then political authority needs to be centralized once again—out of the
hands of neoliberal lords into those of properly elected parliamentarians. Unsur-
prisingly, then, Ankersmit’s sources of inspiration in De nieuwe Middeleeuwen
are nineteenth-century liberals, who in the wake of the French Revolution pur-
sued a similar program by advocating and implementing strict distinctions be-
tween private and public responsibilities. Concretely, Ankersmit draws on
François Guizot, Alexis de Tocqueville, and especially Johan Rudolf Thorbecke,
a Dutch philosopher of history and influential prime minister who defended the
distinction between public and private law cemented into the constitution of
1848 with an argument closely anticipating Ankersmit’s re-feudalization thesis:
“One returns to before this principle, one returns to the medieval state, as soon
as one confuses civil and political law.”119
Is it necessary to add that Thorbecke was a thoroughbred historicist, who as
such has been compared to Ranke by, once again, the éminence grise of the
Groningen department of history, Ernst Kossmann?120 At this point, it may not
be surprising either that Ankersmit’s book manuscript is dedicated to Kossmann,
116. Ibid.
117. Marcel ten Hooven, “Sterke staat, sterke burgers,” Trouw (February 24, 2005).
118. We would like to thank Frank Ankersmit for sharing a draft of this book with us.
119. J. R. Thorbecke, Bijdrage tot de herziening der grondwet (Leiden: P. H. van den Heuvell,
1848), 81, as quoted in Frank Ankersmit, “Bolkestein moet zijn ouderwetse bril afzetten,” De Volks-
krant (March 23, 2009).
120. Kossmann, Thorbecke en het historisme. See also F. R. Ankersmit, “Recensieartikel over J.
Drentje, Thorbecke,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 121,
no. 1 (2006), 35-41.
“my highly esteemed mentor,” in the hope that he will “look down ‘from above’
with some satisfaction on the work of his pupil and . . . will recognize something
of himself in it.”121 Nineteenth-century historicism as interpreted by Kossmann
is a source on which Ankersmit continues to draw, in his capacity as public in-
tellectual and critic of neoliberal privatization.
CONCLUSION
Over against a “thin,” stereotypical image of Ankersmit as a White-inspired
postmodernist, this article has tried to offer a thicker description of the Dutch
philosopher of history by situating him firmly within his European context. We
have argued that Ankersmit’s work has been shaped decisively by the Dutch
historical profession—by the social-scientific moment of the 1970s that he de-
tested as much as by the Huizinga revival to which he actively contributed—and
especially by the University of Groningen, where Ankersmit stayed all of his
professional life, until his retirement in 2010. We have argued that his Groning-
en teacher Ernst Kossmann exerted considerable influence on Ankersmit, most
importantly by introducing his pupil to nineteenth-century historicism as inter-
preted by Meinecke. Retrieving key elements from this historicist tradition is a
Leitmotiv in Ankersmit’s work, or so this article has argued. Nothing is more
characteristic of Ankersmit’s reflections on history and politics alike than his
attempt to translate a historicist Ideenlehre into modern analytical categories,
thereby stripping it of its metaphysical dimensions and emphasizing the aesthet-
ic nature of both historical and political representation.
This does not imply that there are no affinities between White and Ankersmit
or that “postmodern” readings of Ankersmit’s work are off the mark. As said, it
seems plausible that Ankersmit’s reputation as a philosopher of history depends
more on his “postmodern” interventions—his constructivist account of historical
narratives in particular—than on the historicist subtext laid bare in this article.
Also, there have been times in which Ankersmit did not hesitate to call histori-
cism “an anticipation of postmodernism” and postmodernism a “radicalization
of historism.”122 And as long as “post” prefixes convey a sense of dissatisfaction
with the substantives to which they are attached, Ankersmit can well be read as
insisting on the need to move beyond “modernist” fascinations with natural or
social-scientific method. An almost neo-Kantian desire to counter the hegemony
121. Ankersmit, De nieuwe Middeleeuwen, 8.
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of science in history and politics runs like a red thread through his work, from
his earliest Groniek articles to his recent attempts at, once again, reviving Leib-
niz’s monadology.123 Yet, given the myriad of forms such projects can take,
labeling them (negatively) as “postmodern” is by far not as informative as speci-
fying (positively) the resources on which they draw and the visions that inspire
them. In Ankersmit’s case, at least, a contextual reading of an oeuvre permeated
with unfashionable historicist sympathies and situated in a Dutch milieu unfa-
miliar to most of its readers arguably yields more interpretive insight than
catchwords and stereotypes created mainly for polemical purposes.124
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